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Abstract: This paper tries to see the role of the actual expenditure on 
pollution and control equipment in a particular State on the location choice of 
foreign firms in India. Based on Levinson (2001), we compute Industry-adjusted 
pollution abatement expenditure index for 25 States for different time periods 
using Annual Survey of Industries data to see if FDI inflow is affected by any 
variation in pollution abatement expenditure (reflecting environmental 
governance). The index compares the actual pollution abatement expenditure in 
a particular State, unadjusted for industrial composition, to the predicted 
abatement expenditure in the same State (where the predictions are based on 
nationwide abatement expenditures by industry and each State’s industrial 
composition). If adjusted index is low for a State, this implies that the State has 
poor environmental governance and this would induce foreign firms to invest. In 
other words, our study tests for ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis. Our results do not 
find any evidence of pollution haven hypothesis for 21 Indian States. Other 
variables are more important in influencing foreign firms’ decision than 
environmental stringency. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past three decades, developing countries have witnessed a significant 
inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). The total FDI inflows to developing 
countries as a share of  total world FDI has increased from 17% in the early 
1990s to 52% in the year 2013 (UNCTAD, 2013). One obvious reason for large 
FDI inflow to these countries is the liberalisation process embarked on by 
several of these countries in early 1990s and consequently their high growth. 
Besides, the host countries have also devised suitable incentives to attract FDI. 
Another reason often cited in the literature is that FDI may be attracted to 
developing countries due to relatively lenient environmental regulations (termed 
as ‘race to the bottom’) (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Xing and Kolstad, 1998; 
Keller and Levinson, 2002). In other words, a key factor influencing foreign 
firms’ choice of location could be the compliance cost of local environmental 
regulation (Keller and Levinson, 2002).  
One of the ways in which compliance costs can be measured is to look at how 
much firms are spending on the pollution abatement. If these costs are 
aggregated across firms in a particular location, they would reflect the 
environmental governance aspect in that location. A high value of pollution 
abatement expenditure ceteris paribus by a firm of a sector in a State vis-à-vis 
another firm in the same sector but in a different State would indicate greater 
environmental governance in the first State. The present paper tries to see the 
role of the actual abatement expenditure in a particular State on the location 
choice of the foreign firms in India. This is tested by computing an index of 
abatement expenditure for firms in a State using plant level data from the 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) for different years. 
Earlier studies attempting to measure the environmental regulation have used 
either pollution intensity (see for example Mani et al., 1997; Rabindran and Jha, 
2004; and Dietzenbacher and Mukhopadhyay, 2007) or pollution abatement 
cost divided by either total employment or gross state domestic product (GSDP) 
or State’s manufacturing output without controlling for industry characteristics 
(see for instance, Friedman et al., 1992; Duffy-Deno, 1992; Crandall, 1993). A 
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key problem with such measures is that they fail to adjust for industrial 
composition. States that have pollution-intensive industrial compositions such 
as steel, fertilizers, chemicals etc. will incur high pollution abatement costs, 
whether or not they have stringent regulations. Thus, one need to use the 
pollution abatement costs accounting for industry composition as an index of 
regulatory stringency.  
In this paper, we compute industry composition adjusted abatement cost using 
unit level data from ASI for the period 2001-02 to 2009-10. We first aggregate 
the data at NIC 3 digit level (and also at NIC 2 digit level) and then compute the 
index. Subsequently we use panel data techniques to test for pollution haven 
hypothesis for 21 major States of India. Our results do not validate the pollution 
haven hypothesis for Indian States. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows: the next section talks about how 
FDI and environment are linked. Section 3 discusses about measurement of 
environmental governance in the literature. This is followed by the methodology 
to see the role of environmental governance on FDI in different States in India in 
Section 4. The section also gives the methodology to construct industry 
adjusted environmental governance index. The descriptive statistics about the 
index and other control variables is given in section 5. Section 6 reports and 
discusses the estimation results and the paper concludes with policy 
implications in Section 7. 
 
2. Relation between FDI and Environment 
The FDI-environment relationship in literature has been grouped into three main 
strands: 1) the environmental effects of FDI flows; 2) the competition for FDI 
and its effects on environmental standards; and 3) the cross-border 
environmental performance (Pazienza, 2015). It has been argued that despite 
extensive empirical work and case study evidence, there is sill not a clear and 
conclusive understanding of their associated phenomena (Erdogan, 2014; 
Pazienza, 2015).  
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With respect to the first relationship, it has been argued that greater integration 
of the world economy through increased investment flows (and trade) and 
greater mobility of factors will have impact on the environment through three 
different effects – scale effect (moving from small to global scale), technique 
effect (adoption of cleaner technology) and the composition effect (shift in 
preferences to cleaner products and environment with increase in income) 
(Kathuria, 2008; Pazienza, 2015). The net of these three effects will get 
reflected in the ultimate impact on environment. 
The literature exploring the relationship between FDI and environmental 
regulations (i.e., the second group), discusses two distinct phenomena: a) 
pollution haven hypothesis; and b) ‘race to bottom’ or ‘regulatory chill 
hypothesis’. In the context of FDI, pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) 
emphasizes the possibility that investors seek those countries to locate their 
industries where it will be cheaper owing to lower regulatory requirements. 
Interestingly, most authors who focused on the PHH have adopted an empirical 
approach (see Dean, 1992 for survey before 1990 and Erdogan, 2014 for a 
recent survey).  
The second argument, often has been used to oppose globalization, relates the 
impact of foreign investment on local environmental standards. Generally 
known as the ‘race to the bottom’ or ‘regulatory chill effect’, the argument states 
that the foreign firms may induce governments to reduce local environmental 
standards or freeze them at suboptimal levels (Erdogan, 2014). Evidence 
shows that in China, provinces have competed intensely for foreign capital and 
provincial leaders have been tempted to promise preferential treatment to 
potential foreign investors, which includes a tacit (or express) commitment to 
more lax enforcement of environmental standards (Esty and Gentry, 1997). On 
the other hand, in resource-seeking industries, where products are 
homogenous, small cost differences translate into large market share gains, 
and foreign investors can occasionally exert considerable pressure on recipient 
countries (Erdogan, 2014). The competitive pressures however, can also 
operate in the opposite direction as investors insist on higher environmental 
standards. Foreign investors in Costa Rican banana production have been 
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observed to insist upon environmental care, as their European customers 
demand an environmentally sound product (Gentry, 1996 as referred in 
Erdogan, 2014).  
The focus of the present study is however on testing for PHH for Indian states 
and not on responsiveness of environmental standards to FDI.  
 
3. Pollution Abatement Cost as a Measure of Environmental Stringency/ 
Governance 
Three broad methods have been used in the literature to characterize the 
measure of environmental stringency (Keller and Levinson, 2002). These are: a) 
qualitative indices of regulatory stringency, b) quantitative measure of 
enforcement effort on the part of states/countries, and c) measures of 
compliance costs incurred by plants. Crandall (1993) and Friedman et al. (1992) 
are the first few studies that have used industrial composition unadjusted 
pollution abatement cost (as a share of GSDP or employment) as a measure of 
environmental regulation. Later on studies by Levinson (2001) and Keller and 
Levinson (2002) have used industrial composition adjusted pollution abatement 
cost as the measure of environmental regulation.  
It is to be noted that variation in State level environmental stringency though is 
smaller than variation across countries, but using State variation gives three 
benefits. First, there would be much better data on state environmental costs 
than costs at international level. Second, States are more comparable than 
different countries on other non-environmental parameters (Keller and 
Levinson, 2002: 691). Moreover in cross country studies, the costs would be 
different due to prevailing factor market conditions rather than pure abatement 
related costs. This bias is less if analysis is across States for the same country. 
Third, most studies on investment location decision-making processes indicate 
the level of environmental regulations is usually portrayed as having a very 
small role in these decisions (OECD, 1997), it is the factors like political stability, 
size and growth potential of market, access to other markets, labour costs, ease 
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of repatriation of profits, transparency and predictability of administrative and 
legal framework, cultural affinity, infrastructure and quality of life are more 
important (Erdogan, 2014). Many of these factors, however are same across 
states, thus the major key variable influencing locational choice of foreign firms 
would be environmental cost. 
Use of pollution abatement (operating) expenses as a measure of abatement 
cost is preferred for two reasons (Keller and Levinson, 2002). First, operating 
expenses for pollution abatement equipment are easier to identify separately. 
Abatement capital expenses may be difficult to disentangle from other 
investments in production process that have little to do with pollution abatement. 
Second, abatement capital expenditures are highest when new investment 
takes place. This implies that the states which have thriving economies such as 
Gujarat, Tamil Nadu etc., and are having sufficient manufacturing investment 
tend to have high levels of abatement capital expenses, regardless of the 
stringency of those States’ environmental laws. Moreover, operating costs show 
more consistent year to year pattern (Levinson, 2001), whereas capital 
expenses may behave like an impulse more in line with industry business cycle. 
Thus, we should also take pollution abatement expenditure as proxy variable for 
environmental regulation. However, ASI only gives the following three 
measures: a) Expenses incurred in Repair & Maintenance of Pollution 
equipment, 1 which it discontinued from 2008 onwards; b) Gross Addition of 
Pollution Control Equipment expenses during the year; and c) Gross Closing 
Expenses of Pollution Control equipment at the end of the year. In the present 
paper, we use the latter two measures – Gross Addition Expenses and Gross 
Closing Expenses on Pollution Control equipment to compute an index of 
environmental governance.  
 
 
 
 
1 There exist one study (Neelkantha 2015) in Indian context that has used repair & maintenance expenses to compute 
abatement cost index for two years - 2002 and 2005. There seem to be problem in computation as industry adjusted 
abatement cost index are much below one for all the states. Since it is a relative measure, for some of the states which 
are doing more abatement as compared to other states, the index should have value greater than one.  
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4. Methodology 
Measuring Environmental Governance 
As mentioned earlier, Friedman et al., (1992); Crandall (1993) and List and Co 
(2000) have used measure like pollution abatement costs divided by total 
employment or GSDP. Duffy-Deno (1992), on the other hand, has used total 
State-wide pollution abatement operating costs divided by gross State 
manufacturing output as measure of regulation stringency. A key problem with 
such measures is that they fail to adjust for industrial composition. Based on 
Levinson (2001), we compute Industry-adjusted abatement expenditure index 
for 25 States for the different time periods to see if FDI inflow is affected by any 
variation in abatement expenditure (reflecting environmental governance). The 
index compares the actual pollution abatement expenditure in a particular State, 
unadjusted for industrial composition, to the predicted abatement expenditure in 
the same State (where the predictions are based solely on nationwide 
abatement expenditures by industry and each State’s industrial composition). 
The paper however improves from Levinson (2001) and Keller and Levinson 
(2002) paper as it computes industry adjusted abatement expenditure at NIC 3-
digit level instead of NIC-2 digit level as computed by these studies.  
Let the actual abatement expenditure per unit of output be denoted as2 
st
st
st
PS Y
=      [1] 
Where Pst is pollution abatement expenditure in State s in year t, and Yst is the 
manufacturing sector’s contribution to the GSDP of State s in year t. Sst is the 
type of unadjusted measure of compliance costs commonly used. By failing to 
adjust for the industrial composition of each State, it probably overstates the 
compliance costs of States with more pollution-intensive industries and 
understates the costs in States with relatively clean industries. To adjust for 
industrial composition, compare equation (1) to the predicted pollution 
abatement expenditure per unit of GSDP in State s. 
2 Note that we are using the same notations as has been used by Levinson (2001) and Keller and Levinson (2002). 
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where ‘N’ is total number of industries. In India’s case, industries are indexed 
from 15 through 36 (covering 22 industries) following the two-digit 
manufacturing National Industrial Classification (NIC) codes. Yist is the 
contribution of industry i to the GSDP of State s at time t, Yit is the nationwide 
contribution of industry i to the national GDP, and Pit is the nationwide pollution 
abatement expenditure of industry i. In other words, Sst is the weighted average 
pollution abatement expenditure (per unit of GSDP), where the weights are the 
relative shares of each industry in State s at time t. To construct the industry-
adjusted index of State’s stringency, S*st, we compute the ratio of actual 
expenditures in equation (1) to the predicted expenditures in equation (2). 
*
ˆ
st
st
st
S
S
S
=     [3] 
When S*st exceeds 1, industries in State s at time t spend more on pollution 
abatement than those same industries in other States. When S*st is less than 1, 
industries in State s at time t spend less on pollution abatement. By implication, 
States with large values of S*st have relatively more stringent regulations than 
States with small values of S*st (Levinson, 2001).  
Hypothesis 
If adjusted index is low for a State, this implies that the State has poor 
environmental governance and this would induce foreign firms to invest. In other 
words, our study tests for ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis. We thus test the 
following hypothesis: “There exists negative relationship between FDI and 
environmental governance”. To test this hypothesis we used the following 
equation that relates FDI to environmental governance after controlling for 
several state-specific effects such as net state domestic product per capita 
(NSDPc), share of manufacturing in NSDP, quality of infrastructure, geographic 
dummy (nearness to coast) etc. 
FDIs,t = α + βS*s,t-1 + X’s,tγ + εs,t    [4] 
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β is the estimated parameter of State’s abatement expenditure index and is 
predicted to have negative influence on the FDI inflow to the state i.e., higher 
the governance (forcing firms in the state to abate more) lower would be the FDI 
inflow. As can be seen, the index is used with a lag. Given the fact that firms’ 
decision to invest, especially FDI is not instantaneous, it is governance in the 
past that may induce them to invest. γ’s are the coefficients of control variables. 
The control variables included are per capita net income of the state (NSDPc), 
share of manufacturing in NSDP, quality of infrastructure, especially availability 
of electricity as measured by transmission and distribution (T&D) losses, 
investment received by the state i.e., IEM implemented and nearness to coast. 
The likely effect of these control variables is given below. 
Control Variables 
Market Size/Demand: A bigger market attracts FDI (Kathuria et al., 2015). This 
is due to large potential demand and thereby economies of scale (Walsh and 
Yu, 2010). The market size is measured by per capita net state domestic 
product (NSDPc). A bigger market size is hypothesized to have a positive sign 
(List and Co, 2000; Keller and Levinson, 2002; Frediksson et al., 2003; Drukker 
and Millimet, 2007). The variable is used in log form. 
Manufacturing Share: State Domestic Product (SDP) accrues from primary 
(agricultural), secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (services) sectors. The 
manufacturing sector is relatively more capital and energy intensive in contrast 
to the agriculture and the services sector. A state with higher manufacturing 
share is a reflection of the fact that the state is an industrial state and therefore 
would attract more FDI. Therefore the current study uses the manufacturing 
share (Manushr) as a control variable. 
Availability of power: Due to high capital investment required in the initial 
period, a foreign investor often sees whether state has sufficient power. A State 
with higher installed capacity implies greater likelihood of available power, thus 
would be able to attract more FDI. Although installed capacity is a good 
measure of power availability, it may not be in Indian context where many of the 
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states have transmission and distribution (T&D) losses to the tune of 50 per 
cent (Srivastava and Kathuria, 2014). In that scenario, to an investor, what is 
important is not the installed capacity but what is available. A high T&D loss 
also indicates effectiveness of industrial regulation in the state. Thus, we take 
T&D losses as one of the control variables, which would signal foreign firms to 
invest in the State. A state having high T&D losses would have low FDI.  
Nearness to Coast: Many of the foreign firms use developing countries owing 
to their cheap labour, as manufacturing hub for their world-wide exports/supply 
chain (Zhang and Song, 2000). From foreign investor’s point of view, a State to 
act as hub need to have good international connectivity in the form of a sea-port 
so that goods can be exported easily or import of any raw-material/component 
can happen unhindered. Thus, nearness to port would reduce transaction cost 
of the producer. Therefore, a state having sea-port will attract more FDI. Thus, 
is hypothesized to have a positive sign. 
Clustering effect: An existing stock of investment allows positive spillovers 
through linkages. They are also indicative of conducive conditions for 
investment. The industrial entrepreneurs memorandum (IEM) implemented in 
the state may capture this clustering effect as it reflects readiness of State in 
attracting investment. The IEM implemented is also a reflection of better 
institutional characteristics like good governance, political stability, low 
corruption and ease of doing business. We hypothesize that higher the IEM 
implemented in a State, the more FDI it will attract unless the congestion cost 
exceeds the cost of relocating (Adersa and Ray, 1998). 
Time dummy: As our data is for nine years, we have also used a time dummy 
(TIME) that accounts for any macroeconomic changes happening over the 
period and affecting all the states. 
Data 
One key problem while doing the analysis is non-availability of appropriate data, 
especially the FDI. Ideally, we should have used State-wise FDI in 
manufacturing sector. Unfortunately, FDI inflow is either available sector-wise or 
RBI region-wise but not State-sector-wise as is available from RBI or 
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Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP). For example, FDI data 
as reported by Chandigarh RBI office comprises of investment in four States - 
Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh, thereby using the data to 
carry out the State-wise analysis would yield biased results. In absence, we 
have used responses to parliamentary questions to get state-wise FDI.3 To be 
specific, FDI data is response to Lok Sabha unstarred question numbers 182 
dated 01.03.2005; 1032 dated 01.08.2006; 527 dated 24.02.2009 and 1074 
dated 28.11.2011 respectively. The data for all other variables has been 
collected from different government sources. The per capita NSDP and 
Manufacturing share is from Central Statistical Organisation, Power availability 
and T&D losses are from Ministry of Power and reports of Planning 
commission, IEM are from Ministry of Industry and Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy.  
Econometric Specification 
For the given objective, there exist a variety of estimation models. However a 
simple pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model would yield biased and 
inconsistent parameters if time invariant covariates are omitted. If omitted time-
invariant variables are correlated with the environmental governance variable, a 
fixed effect (FE) model will provide a consistent and unbiased estimate of the 
parameters while simultaneously controlling for unobserved unit heterogeneity. 
On the other hand, if these omitted time-invariant variables are uncorrelated 
with the policy variable, a random effect (RE) model would provide a more 
efficient estimate than FE model. The validity of these assumptions is examined 
by Hausman test. In case of presence of auto-correlation and 
heteroscedasticity, we will be using generalized least squares (GLS) method 
that corrects for these two. For the estimation purpose, we limit the sample to 
only 21 States and Union Territories (UTs)4 for which data is available for all the 
3 Incidentally, the data shows extremely high value of FDI for one state in 2006 (nearly 40% of total FDI received in the 
country). This spike and other state-wise data was cross-verified with RBI officials which indicated that the data is 
correct (Source: Personal communication with RBI official in August 2015).  
4 Union Territory (UT) means that the area is under the direct administration of the Government of India. A UT in India is 
similar to the District of Columbia in USA. It is to be noted that Delhi is still a UT, but has been given special status of 
National Capital Region with provision of legislative assembly and a council of ministers. For the present analysis, it has 
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variables for the period 2002-03 to 2009-10. This is because, many of the north-
eastern States and UTs have neither received any FDI nor any consistent data 
are available for their T&D losses or per capita power consumption, thereby 
restricting the number of States5 for analysis to 21.    
The final econometric model estimated is: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ∗𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠−1+ 𝛾𝛾1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑇𝑇&𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠+ 𝛾𝛾4𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾6𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾7− 14𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠 (5) 
The estimations are carried out in STATA 12. 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents State-wise summary statistics for abatement cost after 
controlling for industrial composition (S*) at 3-digit NIC, 2-digit NIC (equation 3) 
and without controlling for industrial composition (S) (equation 1). The 
correlation between adjusted (for 3-digit NIC data) and unadjusted abatement 
expenditure index is 0.9. From the table, we can infer that several States which 
appear to have higher abatement expenditure as per unadjusted index have 
much lower ranking once we allow for their industrial composition. States like 
West Bengal, Meghalaya which are among top five in terms of unadjusted 
pollution abatement expenditure get much lower ranking once we account for 
industrial composition. Similarly, States like Uttarakhand and Jharkhand have 
higher rank after controlling for industrial composition. This implies that using 
the unadjusted measure of compliance would give a misleading picture of some 
of the States’ relative stringency. Column 2 of the table gives adjusted 
abatement expenditure using 2-digit NIC classification. The ranking and values 
hardly change. The correlation between the two is 0.99. The table also indicates 
that there are nine States for which industry adjusted abatement expenditure is 
been considered as UT only. In the present paper, though analysis includes but States and UTs, we have addressed 
them as States only. 
5 In India, to reflect the popular sentiments, the official name of some of the States has been changed in recent past. For 
example, Pondicherry was renamed as Puducherry in 2006, Uttaranchal was renamed as Uttarakhand in 2007 and 
Orissa was renamed to Odisha in 2011. In the present study, we have referred them with their new names only, despite 
the fact that for most part of our data set, they were known by their earlier names. 
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greater than one, this implies that they are spending much more than their 
industrial composition suggests.   
Table 1: Adjusted vs. Unadjusted Abatement Cost Index, Averages 2001-
2009 
Statecode State Name 
Abatement 
Cost Index 
S* (3 digit) 
Abatement 
Cost Index S* 
(2 digit) 
Unadjusted 
Index, S 
1 Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) 0.411 0.419 0.00201 
2 Himachal Pradesh (HP) 0.309 0.284 0.00127 
3 Punjab (Pb) 0.640 0.605 0.001934 
5 Uttrakhand (UK) 1.568 (4) 1.469 0.005045 
6 Haryana (Hr) 0.570 0.528 0.001081 
8 Rajasthan (Rj) 1.077 1.099 0.005496 
9 Uttar Pradesh (UP) 1.267 1.282 0.004616 
10 Bihar (Bi) 0.098 0.104 0.000483 
20 Jharkhand (Jh) 1.642 (3) 1.401 0.004923 
21 Odisha (Or) 2.165 (1) 2.263 0.01251 (1) 
19 West Bengal (WB) 1.447 1.476 0.00646 (4) 
11 Sikkim (Si) 0.269 0.252 0.001755 
13 Nagaland (Na) 0.002 0.001 0.000004 
14 Manipur (Ma) 0.002 0.002 0.000013 
16 Tripura (Tr) 0.000 0.000 0 
17 Meghalaya (Mg) 0.829 0.789 0.00647 (3) 
18 Assam (As) 0.062 0.069 0.000424 
22 Chhattisgarh (CH) 1.287 1.242 0.005559 
23 Madhya Pradesh (MP) 0.966 0.914 0.003674 
24 Gujarat (Gj) 0.994 0.993 0.004878 
27 Maharashtra (MH) 0.875 0.851 0.00291 
30 Goa (Go) 0.388 0.390 0.001821 
28 Andhra Pradesh (AP) 1.467 (5) 1.474 0.00643 (5)  
29 Karnataka (Ka) 2.150 (2) 2.176 0.00715 (2) 
32 Kerala (Kl) 0.911 1.023 0.003778 
33 Tamil Nadu (TN) 0.663 0.691 0.002045 
     
35 Andaman & N. Island (ANN) 0.000 0.000 0.000000 
4 Chandigarh (CG) 3.223 2.910 0.007468 
26 Dadra & Nagar Haveli (DNH) 0.091 0.086 0.000349 
25 Daman & Diu (DD) 0.168 0.144 0.000431 
7 Delhi (DL) 0.128 0.118 0.000206 
34 Puducherry (Po) 0.097 0.082 0.000317 
 
Av. for lowest 5 states 0.035 0.033  
 
Av. for highest 5 states 1.772 1.760  
Source: Own Computation 
 
Table 2 gives trend of environmental stringency measure over three time 
periods: period 1 (2002 to 2004), period 2 (2005 to 2007) and period 3 (2008 to 
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2010). From Table 2, we can see that there are six States namely, AP, Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Odisha, Goa and Haryana which show increasing environmental 
stringency trend over the period. On the other hand, there are eight States 
namely, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Delhi, UP, Uttarakhand and Dadar & 
Nagar Haveli which started with high environmental stringency but over a period 
of nine years, they have become much laxed. Of the remaining states, eight 
States show declined value of index with increase in value in the middle period, 
whereas five States show improved stringency over 9 year period with decline 
in value of index in the middle period. The last row of the table gives average 
value of abatement index for the three periods, which indicates that there is 
hardly any change in environmental stringency across all the States overs the 
period. 
Table 2: Adjusted Abatement Cost Index, Period wise Analysis  
State 
Period 1 
(2002-04) 
Period 2 
(2005-07) 
Period 3 
(2007-10) 
% 
Change 
from 
period 
1 to 3 
Environmental 
Stringency 
Pattern 
AP 1.315 1.320 1.767 34.4 Increasing 
Assam 0.071 0.067 0.049 -30.9 Decreasing 
Bihar 0.149 0.070 0.077 -48.5 Declined 
Chandigarh 3.932 3.959 1.779 -54.8 Declined 
Chhattisgarh 1.379 1.298 1.184 -14.1 Decreasing 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 0.152 0.062 0.058 -62.0 Decreasing 
Daman & Diu 0.228 0.133 0.142 -37.6 Declined 
Delhi 0.179 0.135 0.069 -61.3 Decreasing 
Goa 0.236 0.315 0.612 159.1 Increasing 
Gujarat 1.115 1.016 0.850 -23.7 Decreasing 
Haryana 0.479 0.571 0.659 37.6 Increasing 
HP 0.218 0.193 0.516 136.2 Increased 
Jharkhand 1.982 1.188 1.757 -11.3 Declined 
Karnataka 2.286 2.410 1.754 -23.3 Declined 
Kerala 0.886 0.932 0.916 3.4 Increased 
MP 0.925 0.927 1.047 13.2 Increased 
Maharashtra 1.049 0.883 0.693 -33.9 Decreasing 
Manipur 0.000 0.000 0.006   Increased 
Meghalaya 0.201 1.452 0.834 315.4 Increased 
Odisha 1.555 2.273 2.669 71.7 Increasing 
Puducherry 0.118 0.086 0.087 -26.4 Declined 
Punjab 0.615 0.649 0.658 7.0 Increasing 
Rajasthan 0.688 1.227 1.317 91.4 Increasing 
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Tamil Nadu 0.727 0.597 0.664 -8.7 Declined 
Tripura 0.000 0.000 0.000  No-change 
UP 1.500 1.153 1.149 -23.4 Decreasing 
Uttarakhand 2.342 1.651 0.712 -69.6 Decreasing 
WB 1.520 1.390 1.431 -5.9 Declined 
Average  0.923 0.838 0.927 0.4  
Source: Own compilation 
 
Figure 1 gives the plot for environmental stringency measure between two 
periods – period 1 and 3. States falling above 45 degree line indicates 
increased stringency whereas States falling below suggest decline in 
environmental stringency. As can be seen, barring Odisha and AP, for all other 
States, stringency of environmental governance has declined.  
 
Figure 1: Change in industry adjusted abatement expenditure index (S*) - 
period 1 to 3 
Notes: CG, UK, DD, MH, WB, AP etc. are abbreviations for different states. For 
details, kindly see Table 1. 
 
Interestingly, Figure 2, which gives scatter plot between lnFDI and lagged value 
of industry composition adjusted abatement cost index, does not indicate any 
perceptible relation between the two. 
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Figure 2: Relation between S*t-1 and lnFDI 
 
Table 3 gives the mean values of different variables used in the analysis. As 
can be seen from the table, there is huge variation in all the variables. There are 
states like Assam, Bihar and Jharkhand which have hardly received any FDI. 
On the other hand, Maharashtra tops the FDI recipient State with an average of 
Rs. 4,450 crore over this 9 year period. Similarly, share of manufacturing in 
NSDP is less than five per cent in Bihar against over 25 per cent in Gujarat, 
Goa and Puducherry. Regarding installed capacity, on one hand, we have 
Maharashtra, AP, Karnataka, Gujarat and TN which have more than 5000 MW 
of power generation each against States like Goa which does not produce any 
electricity. The northern States which are not receiving much FDI and have less 
electricity installation are also plagued with high T&D loss. On an average the 
four BIMARU (Bihar, MP, Rajasthan and UP) States account for 40 per cent 
T&D losses for the period. This may discourage FDI coming to these States.  
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Table 3: State-wise Descriptive Statistics (N=189) 
State 
FDI (Rs. 
Crore) 
NSDP per 
capita (Rs.) 
Mfrg share 
(%) 
T&D Loss 
(%) 
Installed 
Capacity (MW) 
IEM 
Implemented 
(Rs. Crore) 
AP 1235.72 (5) 22326.22 9.52 22.12 (5) 6898.51 (2) 988.33 
Bihar 0.02 7791.111 4.40 41.08 598.98 11.44 
Chhattisgarh 207.36 15894.67 15.07 31.75 1650.47 214.89 
Delhi 1716.93 (3) 49469.5 (1) 7.61 37.26 883.87 1.33 
Goa 66.18 47999.29 (2) 29.17 (2) 18.03 (2) 0.02 32.00 
Gujarat 811.23 25429.13 25.56 (3) 28.10 5486.40 (4) 6202.11 (1) 
Haryana 174.95 34153.44 (4) 16.89 (5) 32.76 2603.76 144.33 
HP 97.13 27714.22 9.70 19.47 (4) 443.81 1114.33 (4) 
Jharkhand 0.35 12981.88 21.71 (4) 47.13 1384.47 59.44 
Karnataka 1253.97 (4) 22445.22 14.14 29.14 5188.08 (5) 438.11 
Kerala 68.99 27237.88 6.92 27.51 2080.99 3.11 
Maharashtra 4462.78 (1) 29185.33 16.57 33.59 10254.19 (1) 1297.22 (3) 
MP 38.89 12899 7.51 42.42 3737.53 1571.56 (2) 
Odisha 22.59 14562.78 10.76 46.91 2385.60 43.78 
Punjab 2919.88 (2) 29484.78 (5) 13.00 23.60 4716.60 205.67 
Puducherry 99.50 45540.67 (3) 50.98 (1) 13.83 (1) 32.83 12.56 
Rajasthan 81.68 16441.44 8.72 40.40 3724.64 476.33 
Tamil Nadu 695.85 24633.38 16.75 18.14 (3) 5620.21 (3) 694.89 
Uttrakhand 3.18 20688.22 12.08 37.12 1160.33 510.89 
Uttar Pradesh 132.97 11083.33 9.96 36.01 4721.37 1073.56 (5) 
West Bengal 609.64 21032.89 8.28 28.70 4312.42 642.22 
Average 699.99 24369.2 15.01 31.2 3232.62 749.43 
Note: Figure in parenthesis are the top five ranked States for the variables. 
Source: Own computation 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
Before estimating the model, we first see correlation between different control 
variables. Table 4 gives the spearman correlation matrix and also gives 
significance of the correlation coefficient at minimum 5 per cent level. We find 
that a State with higher NSDP per capita has high installed capacity (positively 
correlation), but has negatively correlation with high manufacturing share. A 
state with high installed capacity is not only able to attract more FDI (correlation 
being 0.55) but also more domestic investment (IEM) (correlation = 0.61) and is 
not having any correlation with T&D losses. Similarly, a coastal state gets high 
FDI (correlation = 0.36) with higher manufacturing share (correlation = 0.3). 
Consequently, with partial correlation being statistically significant for several 
variables, we could not use all the controlled variables together.  
 
17 
 
 
Table 4: Spearman Correlation Matrix 
 
lnFDI 
(Rs. 
Crore) S*t-1 
lnNSDPc 
(Rs. 
Crore) 
Mfrg 
Share 
(%) 
T&D 
Loss 
(%) 
ln(Installed 
Capacity) 
(MW) 
Ln(IEM 
Implemented) 
(Rs. Crore) Coastal 
lnFDI (Rs. 
Crore) 1 
       S*t-1 0.048 1 
      lnNSDPc 
(Rs. Crore) 0.339* -0.441* 1 
     Mfrg Share 
(%) 0.081 -0.005 0.402* 1 
    T&DLoss (%) -0.242* 0.315* -0.664* -0.356* 1 
   ln(Installed 
Cap.) (MW) 0.552* 0.456* -0.089 -0.008 -0.004 1 
  ln(IEM Imple) 
(Rs. Crore) 0.357* 0.221* 0.052 0.0165 -0.018* 0.614* 1 
 Coastal 0.363* 0.158* 0.310* 0.291* -0.432* 0.324* 0.131 1 
Note: * indicates significance at minimum 5% level 
Econometric analysis 
Table 5 reports the results for econometric estimations. We first estimated 
equation 5 by pooling the data for all the States (pooled OLS) (column 1, Table 
5). As discussed, due to omitted variables, the OLS results will be biased, we 
need to use panel data techniques. Subsequently we ran both – fixed effect 
(FE) and random effect (RE) models. First we carry out an F-test to see whether 
individual FE exists or not. Since F value (5.41) is greater than the tabulated 
value, this implies we reject the null hypothesis (i.e., model is pooled OLS) and 
we need to estimate FE and RE models. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 give FE 
and RE estimates. Whether these omitted variables (state-specific differences) 
are fixed or random are tested using Hausman Test as given in the last row of 
Table 5. Since the tests statistic (3.44) is less than the critical value of a Chi-
squared (1df, 5%) (3.84), we accept the null of RE being more efficient. To see 
whether RE exists, we carry out additional test i.e., Breusch-Pagan Lagrange-
Multiplier test. As LM value (58.29) is larger than the critical value, we reject the 
null, thus there exists the individual random effect. Subsequently, we interpret 
only RE model (i.e., column 3). 
Table 5: Testing for Pollution Haven Hypothesis (Dependent variable = ln(FDI)) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS 
 
 
(1) 
FE 
 
 
(2) 
RE 
 
 
(3) 
Heteroskedasti
c panels 
corrected 
Standard errors 
(4) 
S*t-1 -0.160 0.195 -0.0477 0.0492 
 (0.306) (0.416) (0.348) (0.259) 
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lnNSDPc 2.042*** 0.872 1.849*** 1.828*** 
 (0.184) (3.409) (0.396) (0.186) 
Mfrgshare 0.0347* 0.00909 0.0260 0.0321* 
 (0.0205) (0.0676) (0.0353) (0.0197) 
T&D Loss -0.103*** -0.0300 -0.0681** -0.116*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0374) (0.0291) (0.0211) 
Coastal 0.546  0.936 0.499 
 (0.472)  (0.816) (0.435) 
Constant -15.76*** -5.381 -15.07*** -13.33*** 
 (2.290) (36.50) (4.438) (2.136) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.52 0.112  0.512 
F-test/Wald χ2 27.09 (0.00) 1.55 (0.12) 16.1 (0.001) 216.65 (0.00) 
Number of States  21 21 21 
Hausman Test  2.32 (0.67)   
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at minimum 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level 
Source: Own computation 
 
As can be seen from row 1, industry composition adjusted pollution abatement 
expenditure index (S*), though is negative, it is statistically insignificant, thus 
having no impact on FDI investment. This implies that States with more 
stringent environmental norms do not figure in the investment decision of 
foreign firms. With respect to control variables, a State having high per capita 
income (lnNSDPc), a reflection of bigger internal market, is able to attract more 
FDI. A high manufacturing share in the State does not ensure more FDI. On the 
other hand, availability of infrastructure as proxied by T&D losses has a direct 
bearing on foreign firms’ location decision. A State with high T&D losses implies 
less power is available, thus foreign firms shy away from these states. The sign 
of Coastal dummy though is positive, it is not statistically significant in RE 
model.  
The use of panel data with different variables showing change over time and 
consequently possibility of autocorrelation, necessitated the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation (where null is no first order correlation), which gives value of 
2.09 with probability at 16% level. This indicates there does not exist 
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autocorrelation. Pasaran CD (cross-sectional dependence) test is used to test 
whether the residuals are correlated across panels. Cross-sectional 
dependence (also called contemporaneous correlation) can lead to bias in tests 
results. The null hypothesis is that residuals are not correlated and is verified by 
the test results. We also carry out modified Wald test to test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity. The chi-square value of 175.08 indicates the null of 
homoscedasticity (or constant variance) is rejected. Given the problems of 
heteroskedasticity, we subsequently correct for it using panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) model. The results are given in column 4 of Table 5. 
The coefficient values of S* and lnNSDPc retain the same sign and significance 
level even after the correction. Not only S*, all other control variables retain 
same sign and significance level except Mfrg Share which becomes highly 
significant. This suggests that a State with low T&D losses, more per capita 
income and more manufacturing share would attract more FDI. The 
environmental stringency does not influence foreign firms’ decision when other 
infrastructure and market access related factors are available. In other words, 
our study does not validate the ‘pollution haven hypothesis’ in the case of Indian 
States. 
Robustness Testing  
In order to see whether results are robust to the inclusion of control variables, 
we carried out panel corrected heteroskedastic model after dropping control 
variables. Table 6 gives the results where some of the control variables are 
either dropped or alternate control variables are used. Column 2 (Model 2) 
reports the results when Coastal dummy is dropped and installed capacity 
(lnInstalCap) is used. The impact of environmental governance index (S*) 
variable remains same. Column 3 of the table (Model 3) adds investment 
implemented (lnIEM) to Model 2 and drops Mfrgshare. In column 4 (Model 4), 
we include only per capita income (lnNSDPc) and coastal dummy (Coast), 
whereas in Model 5, we use only the environmental governance index variable. 
In model 6 we use only State dummies and exclude all the control variables.  
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Table 6: Testing for robustness of results – Pollution Haven Hypothesis  
(Dependent Variable = ln(FDI)) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 
5 
Model 
6 
S*t-1 0.0492 0.25 0.49 0.49 0.22 0.18 
 (0.259) (0.313) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.313) 
lnNSDPc 1.828*** 2.93*** 3.32*** 2.38***   
 (0.186) (0.89) (0.90) (0.46)   
Mfrgshare 0.0321* -0.0097     
 (0.0197) (0.027)     
T&D Loss -0.116*** -0.046 -0.042    
 (0.0211) (0.031) (0.036)    
Coastal 0.499   1.47**   
 (0.435)   (0.76)   
ln(InstalCap)  0.916*** 0.78***    
  (0.202) (0.23)    
ln(IEM Imple)   0.233***    
   (0.102)    
Constant -13.33*** -30.97*** -35.16***    
 (2.136) (9.61) (10.22)    
State 
Dummies 
No No No No No Yes 
Time 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.512 0.39 0.46 0.34 0.41 0.74 
F-test/Wald 
χ2 
216.65 
(0.00) 
49.31 
(0.00) 
68.8 
(0.001) 
82.36 
(0.001) 
21.96 
(0.001) 
2301.8 
(0.00) 
Number of 
States 
21 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significance at minimum 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level 
The sign and significance of environmental management index (S*) variable 
does not change in all the variants. The results are thus robust to non-inclusion 
of control variables. Results though not reported, we also use lnNSDP instead 
of lnNSDPc, but our main variable retains same sign and significance. Lastly, 
we re-estimate all the models after using S* computed at NIC 2 digit level, the 
results do not change. Our results also remain same irrespective of how we 
compute S* i.e., use of both Gross Closing Expenditure and Gross Addition 
Expenses on pollution abatement yield the same results. Based on the results, 
we can conclude that our study does not validate the ‘pollution haven 
hypothesis’ in the case of Indian States. 
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 7. Conclusion  
The present paper examined the role of environment governance on FDI (i.e., 
tested for Pollution Haven Hypthesis) for 21 States for the nine year period from 
2002 and 2009. In order to test for the hypothesis, the study computed an 
abatement expenditure index adjusted for industrial composition at the State 
level using methodology given by Levinson (2001). The Industry adjusted 
abatement expenditure index indicates there are nine states for which industry 
adjusted abatement cost is greater than one. This implies that they are 
spending much more than their industrial composition suggests. Six States are 
increasingly more spending on abatement over the nine year period, whereas 
eight States show a decreasing pattern. For two States, Odisha and AP, 
abatement index shows not only higher value in 2007-09 period than 2001-03 
period, but also is greater than one.  
The paper then uses this industry composition adjusted pollution abatement 
expenditure index to test for pollution haven hypothesis in panel framework. The 
study finds that once we account for panel specific heteroscedasticity, 
environmental stringency does not influence FDI decision. Based on the 
analysis, paper concludes that a State with low T&D losses and more per capita 
income and manufacturing share would attract more FDI. The environmental 
stringency does not influence foreign firms’ decision when other infrastructure 
and market access related factors are available. Subsequently, we test whether 
results are robust or not. This is done by either dropping the control variables or 
using alternate control variables in panel corrected heteroskedastic model. We 
find that the results are robust to inclusion of control variables. To conclude, our 
study does not validate the pollution haven hypothesis in the case of Indian 
States. Why our study could neither validate nor refute PHH? There are several 
possible reasons: first is though foreign firms establish operations abroad due to 
low operational cost, the relevance of pollution abatement cost vis-à-vis total 
operating cost may be highly limited (Erdogan, 2014). Second, even if this cost 
is high, this may be low as compared to other countries from where FDI is 
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originating or alternate destinations. Therefore, it may not matter where to 
invest within a country. Third and last, studies have advocated that foreign firms 
generally seek consistent environmental enforcement and not lax enforcement 
(see for example, OECD, 1997). This may be true in the case of Indian States 
too. 
The paper though comes up with important findings, has some limitations and 
can be extended to address these limitations. As mentioned, we had to rely on 
parliamentary questions to get State-wise FDI, which shows extremely high 
value of FDI for one State in 2006 (nearly 40% of total FDI received in the 
country). Moreover, the paper considers entire FDI inflow in the state. Instead of 
total FDI, only manufacturing FDI needs to be looked to see the effect of 
environmental governance. Another extension of present work would be testing 
pollution haven hypothesis only for polluting type FDI i.e., FDI in chemical or 
fertilizer sector. Lastly, if there is a race to bottom, instead of pollution haven 
hypothesis for Indian States, then FDI and environmental governance would be 
endogenous. The testing of which requires use of instrument variable 
estimations or GMM, thus a further extension of the present work.   
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